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Abstract:   
This report focuses on state government appropriations to state arts agencies (SAA), a 
primary figure in arts and cultural policy in the United States.  A dynamic panel data 
estimator can identify the fiscal, institutional, and demographic determinants on SAA 
appropriations.  Agency budgets are particularly sensitive to past appropriations, past 
state revenues and NEA grants, some demographic variables, party control of state 
government, and state budgeting rules.  Federal funds attract, rather than crowd out, state 
appropriations.  While the influence of some demographic variables may be shifting over 
time, income growth continues to explain much of SAA appropriations.   
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper examines a specific category of state government expenditures using variation 
over time and across states to identify the different influences on state budgeting 
decisions.  The dynamic panel-data model allows testing of several hypotheses 
concerning the determinants of appropriations, namely fiscal, institutional, and 
demographic variables.  The results add robust evidence to the empirical literature on 
state budget dynamics and shed light on an important and contentious state-level policy 
area.   
 
This paper focuses on appropriations to state arts agencies (SAAs), a primary figure in 
arts and cultural policy in the United States.  By 1974, all states had established an SAA.  
Although a few are much older, most SAAs were created largely to accept grants from 
the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) after its creation in 1965 (Lowell 2004, 
Netzer 1978).  The history and operations of SAAs have been thoroughly described 
elsewhere (Lowell 2004, Mulcahy 2002, Schuster 2002).  SAA funding levels vary 
greatly across states.  Per-capita SAA funding in 2004 ranged from $4.49 per person in 
Hawaii to $0 per person in Missouri, with an average of $0.99 per capita.1  Over the past 
36 years, Hawaii has the highest average per-capita SAA appropriations ($4.48), while 
Texas has the lowest ($0.19).  Currently, about 81% of SAA budgets derive from state 
appropriations, plus only about 10% from NEA grants (Olsen 2004).  Millions of artists 
and over 20,000 organizations are funded by SAAs (Lowell 2004, NASAA 2005), 
making them a major force in public support of arts and culture. 
 
In light of the recent fiscal crisis for states, public funding of the arts becomes even more 
intriguing.  With SAAs accounting for almost 30% of all public arts funding (Mulcahy 
2002), arts and cultural programs may be particularly sensitive to conditions of state 
budgets.  Yet the relationship is hardly reciprocal.  On average, states allocate less than 
0.05% of their annual budgets to SAAs (NASAA 2005).  Often considered a luxury or 
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nonessential publicly provided good, arts programs may be particularly vulnerable in 
times of recession.  There is also disagreement over the constituency served by SAAs 
(Lowell 2004, Jacobs 2004).  Previous observers have characterized the constituency of 
public arts funding as rather elite (Grampp 1989), narrow (Lewis and Brooks 2005), 
highly networked (Barsdate 2001), and diversifying (Schuster 2002).  The nature of SAA 
constituencies should affect the SAAs’ susceptibility to budgetary shocks.   
 
Little is known about the effects of socioeconomic and demographic factors, institutional 
context, and larger political and fiscal cycles on state-level arts expenditures.  To explore 
these effects, the remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature on state expenditures and SAAs budgets in particular.  This section 
also sketches a theoretical model of SAA appropriations.  Section 3 outlines the empirical 
estimation procedure, while Section 4 presents the results of the statistical analyses and 
hypotheses tests.  Finally, a discussion of the results concludes. 
 
2.  Literature Review and Theory 
 
Previous literature on state budget-setting has focused on overall levels of spending by 
state governments and occasionally on spending in broad categories.  Besley and Case 
(2003) review much of this literature.  They offer explanations for its inconsistencies and 
show some effects on spending of party competition, demographic composition, and 
institutional rules.  They acknowledge that more research is needed to better understand 
these relationships, a challenge taken up by this paper.   
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 Sheffrin (2004) also recently summarizes much of this literature.  He observes an 
emphasis on institutional rules and the role of political parties in models of state-level 
spending.  Alt and Lowry (1994, 2000) show how differing party control of state 
governance can influence spending levels.  While Democrats seek larger public budgets, 
Republicans cut revenues more in response to surpluses.  Alt and Lowry, and others, have 
explored the role of balanced budget rules and other restrictions on state budgeting (see, 
for example, ACIR 1987, Poterba 1994, Craig et al. 1988, Maag and Merriman 2003).   
 
Merrifield (2000) goes further in modeling the determinants of state expenditure and 
taxation.  He stresses the role of institutional variables, beyond the simple median voter 
approach, in explaining state expenditures.  Using data from 1980, 1985, and 1990, he 
estimates strong effects from voter preference variables and some institutional variables, 
although balanced budget requirements played a modest role.  James Payne (1998) looks 
at fifty years of overall state revenues and expenditures and identifies the temporal 
relationship between taxing and spending in the states.  By examining each state 
separately, he finds that revenue changes cause spending changes in about half of the 
states. 
 
Other studies have analyzed expenditures in different state spending categories.  For 
instance, Dye and McGuire (1992) characterize state spending patterns and offer stylized 
facts to explain spending pressures in several categories.  McCarty and Schmidt (1997) 
use a vector autoregressive framework to show how broad state-level spending categories 
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exhibit little crowding out.  Increases in spending in one area are paid for via higher 
revenues rather than decreased spending in other areas.   
 
This previous literature is largely empirical, and it tends to focus on general state-level 
expenditures or spending in major categories.  Earlier research has tended to examine 
spending on major, priority areas for state budgets rather than spending on a particular 
agency.  For example, Taggart (1989) investigates states’ spending on corrections, tests 
several hypotheses about determinants of corrections funding, and observes spending 
levels to hinge closely on previous year’s spending.  Manwaring and Sheffrin (1997) 
explored state spending on education to test for effects of litigation and educational 
finance reform.  Besley and Case (2003) model spending on family assistance and 
workers compensation, in addition to overall spending.  This paper continues this line 
inquiry by further narrowing the scope of analysis: to the appropriations to a specific state 
program or agency.   
 
Although a small program area, state arts agencies have attracted much attention.  In their 
very early analysis of SAA appropriations, Hofferbert and Urice (1985) find SAAs an 
excellent “small-scale policy” area.  Later, Netzer (1992) also explores determinants of 
SAA budget levels in 1987.  Recently, Lewis and Rushton (forthcoming) examine budget 
determinants over 24 years in a basic fixed-effects model that emphasizes demographic 
influences.  The following analysis exploits over 30 years (rather than just five for 
Hofferbert and Urice and just one for Netzer) in a considerably more robust statistical 
framework.   
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 A public choice approach to state program appropriations directs attention to institutional 
factors, relevant constituencies, and incentives facing decision-makers.  The previous 
literature has highlighted important roles for balanced budget rules, party control of state 
governance, fiscal health and overall state income, and constituency strength.  
Appropriations can also be expected to follow the growth in the constituency served, the 
number of actual or potential beneficiaries of a program.   
 
A handful of economists have discussed SAAs in a public choice context.  Grampp 
(1989) identifies the opportunity for and evidence of rent-seeking over arts funding.  The 
possibility of arts agencies’ “capture” at the hands of rent-seekers is emphasized by 
Lingle (1992), Peacock (1994), and Rizzo (1998).  Frey (2000) and others have long 
wondered how publicly funded arts will alter the types of arts produced.  Rushton (2001) 
notes the lack of inquiry into the process by which rent-seeking behavior translates into 
changes in policy.  He questions the notion that arts funding results from elites lobbying 
for transfers, as arts programs may enjoy wide support from the public.   
 
Besley and Case (2003) offer a useful model to apply to SAA appropriations.2  The 
appropriations Y in state i for year t can be modeled as: 
 Yit = f(Cit, Iit, Tit) 
where vectors C, I, and T represent political composition, institutional context, and 
economic and demographic characteristics affecting policy preferences, respectively.  
This relationship captures the potentially complex policy process that determines 
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appropriations given political, social, and economic conditions.  Besley and Case’s 
equation (2) can be adapted to an empirical model: 
 Yit = αi + βt + ψCit + ωIit + γTit + τHit + ηit , 
where Hit is a vector of historical variables that includes lagged values of Y and of other 
political controls.  A state indicator is given by αi, a time indicator by βt, and an error 
term by ηit.  For SAA budgets, primary components of the C, I, and T vectors should 
include:  general state revenues, party control of state governance, voter turnout, NEA 
grants, balanced budget restrictions, demographic composition, and economic conditions.  
The H vector should include historical SAA appropriations, revenue levels, debt levels, 
and NEA grant levels.  By empirically estimating this model, this paper contributes more 
evidence on the dynamics of state budgeting. 
 
The paper’s second major contribution is to provide new tests of several of the key claims 
of the literature on public funding of the arts.  Most of these findings emphasize the role 
of fiscal pressures, institutional context, and constituency efficacy.  Lowell (2004) argues 
that SAAs are particularly vulnerable to budget cuts during fiscal crises.  Olsen (2004) 
and NASAA (2005) echo this by noting that fiscal conditions are the single largest 
determinant of SAA appropriations.  Hofferbert and Urice (1985) claim that “policy 
norms” (measured by state-level spending in certain areas) explain much of the 
appropriations.  Debate over government-funded arts follows closely along party and 
ideological lines, although links to actual policy decisions are less clear (Lewis and 
Brooks 2005, Lewis and Rushton forthcoming).  Getzner (2002) tests for the influence of 
party control on public cultural expenditures in Austria and finds none.  The location of 
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the SAA within state governance (in cultural affairs department, in economic 
development department, etc.) may affect its political autonomy (Mulcahy 2002) and also 
its appropriations. 
 
Beyond fiscal and institutional factors, constituencies are frequently expected to exert 
influence over agency budgets.  Boles and Scheurer (2007) find strong influence of party, 
ideology, and constituency in arts votes by Representatives in the U.S. Congress.  Lowell 
(2004) observes an important role of constituents in securing SAA funding, even while 
the SAA constituency appears to be changing over recent decades.  Arts patrons, the 
educated (and urban) elite, supported SAA funding while actual and potential grantees 
conducted most lobbying efforts (Lowell 2004).  Barsdate (2001) observes how advocacy 
networks developed alongside growing SAA budgets in the 1990s.  On the other hand, 
Rushton (2003) suggests that recently declining public arts funding may be due to rising 
transaction costs, especially those associated with increasing cultural diversity in the 
nation.  In that case, we might expect to see a general erosion or diffusion of the SAAs’ 
constituency base over time.  Hofferbert and Urice (1985) find that constituency variables 
do not play a large role in SAA appropriations, while agency age and NEA funding had 
some impact.   
 
Revenue in the arts sector from other, possibly substitute, sources may also affect SAA 
appropriations.  The interaction between private contributions and government funding of 
charitable organizations has received much attention in the literature (e.g., Ferris and 
West 2003, Brooks 2000, Steinberg 1993, Lindsey and Steinberg 1990).  Some of it has 
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focused specifically on the arts (e.g., Prieto-Rodríıguez and Fernández-Blanco 2006, 
Borgonovi and O’Hare 2004, Hughes and Luksetitch 1999).   This “crowding out” 
literature emphasizes explaining how charitable contributions made or received respond 
to shifts in government funding.  In the arts sector, the evidence is mixed at best (Brooks 
2004, 2000).  Borgonovi and O’Hare (2004) found NEA support and arts donations to be 
independent at a national level.  Even if aggregate arts donations may not respond to 
public funding, the possibility that public funding responds to private support has been 
occasionally acknowledged in the arts and other sectors (Brooks 2000, A. Payne 1998).  
Where available data permit, proxies for private support of the arts can also be included.   
 
3.  Empirical Model 
 
The empirical analysis here estimates a model of state SAA appropriations using panel 
data.  The SAA budget level in a given state-year depends on the previous year’s budget 
level, other past and current fiscal variables, and other exogenous variables.  This model 
structure raises concerns about the autoregressive nature of the data and exogeneity of 
explanatory variables.  Simple OLS may be biased and inconsistent because of the 
presence of an endogenous (lagged dependent) variable as a regressor.  
 
The empirical model employed here considers annual SAA appropriations to be a 
function of several factors according to the following equation: 
 Yit = αi + βt + ρYit-1 + ψCit + ωIit + γTit + τHit + vi + ηit .   (1) 
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Yit-1 represents the previous year’s SAA appropriation in state i.  As before, political 
composition, institutional context, and economic and demographic factors constitute 
vectors C, I, and T, respectively.  Hit is a vector of historical variables other than Yit-1.  A 
state-level disturbance term, vi, is also included.  There is a white noise error term, ηit, 
which is assumed to be serially uncorrelated (i.e., E[ηit ηis] = 0, for any t ≠ s).  Similar 
dynamic specifications with a lagged dependent variable can be found in Manwaring and 
Sheffrin’s (1997) partial adjustment model of state school expenditures, McCarty and 
Schmidt’s (1997) VAR model of state expenditures by category, and Getzner’s (2002) 
model of public cultural expenditures in Austria.  
 
The estimation strategy employed here uses Arellano and Bond’s (1991) dynamic panel-
data estimator.  Even with serially uncorrelated errors ηit in (1), right-hand side regressor 
Yit-1 remains correlated with vi, leaving ordinary estimators biased and inconsistent.  
Taking the first differences, equation (1) becomes: 
 Yit – Yit-1 = β + ρ(Yit-1 – Yit-2) + ψ(Cit – Cit-1) +  
ω(Iit – Iit-1) + γ(Tit – Tit-1) + τ(Hit – Hit-1) + ηit – ηit-1.  (2) 
First-differencing equation (1) eliminates vi but leaves the difference in lagged Yit 
correlated with the error term via ηit-1.  Many instruments are available to estimate (2), 
based on moment conditions that follow from standard assumptions that ηit is 
uncorrelated with Yi0, vi, and other ηis for all s ≠ t (Ahn and Schmidt 1995).  The Arellano 
and Bond estimator uses lagged levels of the dependent and predetermined variables, as 
well as differences in strictly exogenous variables, as instruments.  The validity of using 
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lagged values of Yit as instruments for differenced equations for later periods hinges on 
the moment conditions implied by assuming ηit to be serially uncorrelated. 
 
Estimating (2) using lags of the endogenous (Y) and exogenous (C, I, T) and 
predetermined (H) variables via GMM yields estimates for β, ρ, ψ, ω, γ, and τ.  
Instruments for (2) derive from lagged levels of endogenous and predetermined variables 
and differences of strictly exogenous variables from all time periods.  Notice that, for the 
differenced equation in (2), the instruments must come from lags at least three periods 
prior (i.e., for Hit-s, s ≥ 3).  The construction in (2) differences out the time-invariant state 
fixed effects.  By constructing Tit carefully, however, state fixed-effects on changes in 
levels of Yit (but not state fixed-effects on levels of Yit) can be identified.3  Moreover, the 
constant term in the GMM estimation can be replaced with a constant time trend, 
interpreted as annual change in Yit, ceteris paribus. 
 
Several specification tests are employed for the estimation of equation (2).  Tests for the 
lack of serial correlation and possibly over-identifying restrictions, following Arellano 
and Bond (1991), are needed to verify whether the estimator is consistent.  First, a 
second-order autocorrelation test (m2) is performed based on average covariance in the 
residuals.  The consistency of Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator depends on  
E[(ηit – ηit-1)(ηit-2 – ηit-3)] = 0 even when E[(ηit – ηit-1)(ηit-1 – ηit-2)] ≠ 0.  Second, a Sargan 
test of over-identifying restrictions is performed.  Large statistics for these tests suggests 
that the assumption of no serial correlation may be inappropriate for this sample.  A small 
value for Sargan’s s lends support to the validity of the instruments used in this approach. 
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 Private arts support might belong in equation (1), yet its possible endogeneity must be 
addressed.  Two approaches are found in the crowding out literature, although they treat 
government funding as endogeneous.  First, inspired by Brooks (2000), last year’s private 
arts support can enter (1) as part of H.  His intuition holds: if government reacts to private 
contributions, then the previous year’s contributions are the most observable (and this 
year’s appropriations cannot affect last year’s private contributions).  Second, inspired by 
Abigail Payne (1998), this year’s private arts support enters as endogenous regressor.  
The Arellano-Bond estimator instruments for the endogenous private support variable as 
outlined above. 
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
The state-level variables in this panel dataset are listed in Table 1.4  Various sources 
provide the data for the empirical estimation.  The data range from 1969 to 2002, with 
some missing values (generally for those states without SAAs prior to 1974).  Historical 
fiscal variables include SAA appropriations, state revenue, state debt, and NEA grants.  
Political composition and institutional variables include dummy variables for different 
situations of party control of state government, voter turnout, strictness of state balanced 
budgeting rules, the year of SAA establishment, and fixed effects of years in a four-year 
presidential term.  Economic and demographic factors consist of population, density, 
race, age, education, and income variables. 
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To examine the role of substitute sources of support for the arts, two proxies for private 
support for the arts are considered.  First, an indicator of state-level personal income 
deriving from arts-related industries is constructed.5  This variable captures earned and 
charitable income, includes some non-arts income because of the crude industry 
classifications, and spans 1969-2002.  Second, a measure of charitable contributions 
received by arts organizations is available for 1989-2002 from the National Center for 
Charitable Statistics (NCCS).6  This variable, however, includes private gifts and 
government grants to arts, culture, and humanities public charities.   
 
Perhaps surprisingly, these indicators of private arts support had virtually no impact on 
the various models considered below.  In no case was the private arts support variable 
significant at the 10% level.  This holds for various constructions of both variables: arts-
related income or contributions to arts charities.  This holds whether the variable entered 
as a lagged exogenous or endogenous variable.  Most importantly given this analysis’s 
focus, including the private arts support variable had only minor effects, if any, on the 
other coefficients.  This weak role for private arts support may be due to data limitations 
(e.g., short timespan, poor proxies for substitute support), independence of SAA 
appropriations from private arts support, or something else.  Because this analysis cannot 
reject the hypothesis that SAA appropriations are independent of private arts support and 
for simplicity, this variable is omitted from the estimations below. 
 
4.  Results  
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Table 2 depicts the results of the dynamic panel-data estimation.  Each model is 
estimated using the Arellano-Bond one-step estimator with asymptotic standard errors 
robust to general time series and cross-section heteroskedasticity.   The instruments 
include all lagged levels of SAAt-2, the lagged levels of the fiscal variables, and all the 
first differences of the remaining regressors.  The models in Table 2 explain most of the 
variation over time and across states in SAA appropriations.  Model 1 is the base model, 
with Model 2 adding state fixed effects and Model 3 adding additional T variables.  The 
reported test statistics, the m2 and Sargan’s test, are suitably close to zero in all models to 
not imply that the model is misspecified.  Serial correlation in the errors is not evident.  
The choice of instruments and the Arellano and Bond approach appear to be appropriate 
for these data.     
 
As expected, lagged appropriations are strong predictors of current funding levels.  The 
effect of state revenue on SAA funding differs depending on whether state-specific SAA 
growth rates are allowed.  The current and previous two years of state revenue lack 
significance, jointly and individually, in Model 1.  With state fixed effects, Model 2 
shows significant positive effects from revenue in the current and previous two periods.  
Recent state debt levels adversely affect SAA funding, at least when state fixed effects 
are included.  Higher debt levels from two years prior, however, are positively associated 
with SAA appropriations.  NEA grants attract more state government appropriations to 
SAAs, both in the present year and two years hence.   
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State demographic variables’ effects also depend on whether state fixed effects are 
incorporated.  Without controlling for state fixed effects, population and density appear 
positively and weakly related to SAA appropriations.  Model 2 shows strong positive 
effects of population density on SAA appropriations.  Race lacks much explanatory 
power.  More youthful populations and more elderly populations, however, tend to 
receive lower SAA funding.  Education levels appear unrelated to SAA funding, perhaps 
reflecting the considerable measurement error in the imputed College variable.  Model 1 
estimates the income elasticity of SAA funding as 0.78.   
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Political context variables also play an important role.  Party control of state governance 
is closely associated with SAA appropriations under all models.  Relative to the omitted 
category of divided state government with a Democratic governor, SAA appropriations 
rise faster under divided government with a Republican governor.  Moreover, states with 
divided houses of the legislature and a Republican governor also have higher SAA 
appropriation growth rates on average.  In short, Republican governors bode well for 
SAA funding only if the government stays divided.  Over time, funding appears to be in 
steady decline.  Each year brings a 2 – 6% reduction in SAA budgets, all else equal.  An 
electoral cycle effect is evident here, with appropriations dipping in the first year of a 
presidential term.  Higher voter turnout is associated with lower budgets, although this 
effect is not statistically significant.  Newer SAAs have slightly faster budget growth 
rates.7  Stringency of state balanced budget rules also exhibits a modest, positive effect on 
SAA appropriations growth rates. 
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 Model 2 in Table 2 shows the estimated model after controlling for state fixed-effects.  
Table 3 offers more insight into the individual states’ effects.  This might be taken as a 
measure of states’ time-invariant, omitted “SAA friendliness.”  To make interpreting the 
state-specific effects more straightforward, the estimates in Table 3 derive from a version 
of Model 2 that omits time-invariant variables (Origin Year and BalanceBudg).  These 
effects range from -5% to 2% (growth rates in SAA appropriations), relative to the 
omitted category of Nebraska.  Vermont and Florida’s SAA appropriations exhibited 5% 
slower growth rates, while Nevada and Indiana were marginally faster.  The rightmost 
column represents the departmental location of the SAA within state government as of 
2004.  It appears that SAA growth rates do not vary systematically across the 
departmental location of agencies.   
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Several hypotheses related to others’ observations about public arts funding can also be 
tested.  First, the hypothesis that NEA grants complement SAA budgets cannot be 
rejected, as it appears that states receiving larger NEA grants also appropriate more to 
their SAAs.8  Second, the influence of political composition variables on SAA budgets is 
apparent.  The hypothesis that SAA budgets grow more under Democratic leadership, 
perhaps because Democrats tend to push for larger state spending, appears only partly 
true.  The results for Models 1 and 2 indicate larger SAA budgets when Republicans 
control the governorship but not also both houses of the legislature.  Third, the 
proposition that institutional context affects SAA funding finds some support.  The 
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hypothesis that some states are more arts-friendly than others can be tested using Model 
2, a conclusion that appears warranted for at least a few states.  The existence of a 
departmental location effect is not evident.9  Stricter budget rules are associated with 
faster growth in SAA appropriations, rather than slower growth as Barsdate (2001) 
suggests.  The inability of SAA funding to keep pace with inflation presents another 
challenge for SAA budgets and SAA supporters (who do not appear to be building an 
increasingly effective lobby, at least relative to other interests). 
 
Table 2 also helps identify the role of different constituencies in predicting 
appropriations.  The significance of population density implies the urban core 
constituency has some effect.  The affluent also seem to have some success in affecting 
SAA budget growth.  Racial composition of states, however, appears mostly unrelated to 
SAA appropriations.  Moreover, the share of the population that is young or elderly is 
inversely related to SAA appropriations.  From this analysis, the middle of the age 
distribution positively affects appropriations rather than the young or elderly constituents.  
Table 2 offers little support for those tying SAA appropriations to arts education 
initiatives or to agency capture by old, white art lovers. Appropriations are closely tied to 
income, however.  Education levels, which are commonly found to be strong predictors 
of support for the arts (e.g., Peterson et al. 2000), lack a significant relationship in Table 
2.  This may be due to College being an inadequate measure of education.  The results for 
income and education are roughly similar to Lewis and Rushton (forthcoming).  The 
relationship between education and SAA funding is worth exploring in future research. 
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Hypotheses about a changing constituency base over time can also be tested.  Rushton 
(2003) suggests that increasing diversity may lead to declining public support for the 
Arts.  Lowell (2004) also emphasizes the SAAs’ shifting constituency base.  To examine 
whether various constituencies’ influence on SAA appropriations has changed over time, 
Model 1 was estimated with each of the demographic variables also interacted with the 
year.  The hypothesis that these interaction terms jointly have no effect can be rejected 
(χ2(8) = 45.92).  Taken individually, no time trend is evident in the influence of 
population, education, or income.  On the other hand, Youth and Elders exhibit 
significant negative effects in this model.  This negative effect is attenuated over time, so 
much so that effect on appropriations becomes positive by 1991and 1981 for Youth and 
Elders, respectively.  This approach also detects a significant positive effect of Density 
and Black on appropriations, but this effect is also fading over time.  The relationships 
between SAAs and their constituents do appear to be changing over time.    
 
Finally, income and revenue elasticities can be investigated in more detail.  Several 
observers have noted the possibility that SAA appropriations may do well in times of 
economic growth, but suffer disproportionately in recessions.  This possible asymmetry is 
tested using these data in Model 3.  New variables are constructed for the three state 
revenue variables in Model 1 and for the Income variable.  These are the same first-
differenced variables interacted with a dummy variable indicating whether the change 
was positive, effectively censoring negative changes to equal zero.  Incorporating these 
variables into Model 3 allows for different elasticities for revenue or income growth than 
for their declines.  The revenue growth elasticities are not individually significantly 
 18 
different from zero, similar to Model 1, except the elasticity of Revenuet-2 during declines 
becomes significant.  It seems that, when revenues fall by 10%, SAA appropriations two 
years later are expected to fall by 1.2%.  (In times of revenue growth, a 10% revenue 
increase is associated with a 1.3% appropriations cut two years later, although this 
elasticity is not significantly different from zero.)  The income growth coefficient (β = 
0.76) is significantly different from zero (z = 2.17).  Asymmetry in the income elasticity 
appears, where SAA appropriations do not significantly fall with income declines but 
have an elasticity of 1.09 (z=3.41) when incomes rise.  Although there may be a modest 
and asymmetric relationship between lagged revenues and SAA appropriations, the 
income elasticity exceeds unity for periods of income growth and is quite small for 
periods of declining income.   
 
The income elasticity estimates obtained here compare fairly well with some other 
commonly cited income elasticity measures for the arts.  The estimate in Model 1 
resembles a general relationship between income and willingness-to-pay for arts 
programs.  In the sample of original contingent valuation studies identified in Noonan 
(2004), the average WTP rises 7.4% for each 10% increase in the mean income of the 
study sample.10   
 
These results lend little support to those who fear that SAAs fare particularly badly 
during recessions.  SAA appropriations are indeed sensitive to fluctuations in state 
revenues, and the effects are felt for several years, but there is scant evidence that the 
effects are significantly worse when revenues decline.  The lagged effect of revenue 
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changes on SAA appropriations when revenue falls arguably compares favorably to the 
negative (but insignificant) revenue effect on appropriations when revenue rises.   
 
5.  Discussion 
 
In summary, the appropriations to SAAs follow a somewhat predictable pattern.  
Previous year’s funding levels and other fiscal variables account for much of the 
variation in SAA appropriations.  In particular, general state revenues from up to two 
years ago affect current SAA funding, and NEA grants complement state arts 
appropriations.  Statewide demographic trends also guide SAA funding.  Having fewer 
youths and elderly predicts larger SAA budgets, just as rising prosperity is a driving force 
in rising SAA appropriations.  The party composition of state governance plays an 
important, but complex, role as well.  Divided state governments bode well for SAA 
funding.  Temporal effects are strong also, with SAA budget growth suffering a 
downward time trend and cyclical declines associated with the first year of presidential 
terms.   
  
These findings significantly add to our understanding of SAA budgeting processes.  As 
reviewed in Section 2, many previous commentators have asserted or suspected 
determinants of SAA funding.  Table 4 lists a selection of these expected relationships 
alongside the evidence from the present analysis.  Some claims find support, while others 
do not.  Perhaps most importantly, the results indicate that NEA funding leverages even 
more state appropriations.  Crowding out from federal aid is not observed.  Moreover, 
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SAAs are sensitive to shocks to overall state budgets, and the effects of changes in 
general revenues ripple through SAA budgets for several years.  The claim that SAA 
budgets are particularly vulnerable during state fiscal crises finds only limited support 
here.  Revenue declines have a significant, negative effect on SAA appropriations with a 
two-year lag, but appropriations may not fare better following revenue gains.  Party 
politics matters, but it is not as simple as Republicans seeking to cut SAA budgets.  The 
growth in SAA budgets over time owes greatly to the growth in overall state budgets and 
increasing prosperity – both of these strong trends have outweighed the underlying 
negative growth rate of SAA budgets. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
  
Several variables that might have been expected to influence SAA funding do not.  Voter 
turnout and racial composition show no significant relationships even when state effects 
are included.  Surprisingly, education levels are not positively related.  More 
disconcerting for arts education advocates, perhaps, is the negative relationship between 
youthful populations and SAA appropriations.  A few states stand out as especially strong 
or weak funders of their SAAs.  Finally, the locus of the SAA within state government 
lacks a clear influence on state governments’ funding growth rates.   
 
The empirical analysis demonstrates the impact of particular fiscal pressures, institutional 
rules, and constituents on state agency funding over the past three decades.  The results 
bring robust empirical evidence to debates concerning public arts funding via SAAs, a 
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major source of direct government support for the arts in the United States.  Agency 
budgets are particularly sensitive to past appropriations, past state revenues and NEA 
grants, some demographic variables, party control of state government, and state 
budgeting rules.  While the influence of some demographic variables may be shifting 
over time, income (and income growth in particular) continues to explain much of SAA 
appropriations.  From a public policy standpoint, these findings offer a useful vantage to 
assess public arts funding.  Fiscal pressures, institutional rules, and changing 




1  Dollar figures throughout this paper are given in 2000 US$, unless otherwise noted. 
2  Merrifield’s (2000) model of spending might also be used here.  He models SPEND = 
f(marginal utility of public office, marginal perceived benefits of spending, marginal 
perceived costs of spending, income, tastes, decision-making constraints).  Such an 
approach can lead to comparable empirical tests. 
3  Specifically, partition Tit into (T1it T2it) with state fixed-effects T1it = T1is, for all t ≠ s. 
Let the corresponding vector of parameters for T1it vary over time at a constant rate.  
Estimating (2) with state fixed-effects T1it reveals parameters γ1, which correspond to 
state-specific rates of change. 
4  Additional variables were tested in this model, but their role was found to be minimal 
or not enough years were available.  They were excluded for the sake of parsimony.  
These variables include public school expenditures, percent Hispanic, additional age 
categories, gross state product, gross state product from federal sources, and additional 
variables describing state budgeting rules. 
5  The variable ArtsIncome is estimated from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
annual state estimates for personal income (http://www.bea.gov/regional/spi/) for 1969-
2000.  Two SIC categories are summed: “amusement and recreation services” (835), and 
“museums, botanical, zoological gardens” (865).  Values for 2001 and 2002 are imputed 
based on a GLS regression using state fixed effects, the BEA’s estimates for similar 
NAICS categories, and a time trend.  Details available upon request.  The log of real 
ArtsIncome is used. 
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6  This alternate ArtsIncome variable derives from the NCCS’s Core Files containing 
financial information on reporting public charities since annual reporting began in 1989.  
The log of total real contributions, gifts, and grants reported for “Arts, Culture, and 
Humanities” charities in each state is used.  Unfortunately, NCCS does not report non-
governmental contributions separately.   
7  Because the Origin Year and BudgetBal variables are time-invariant, they must enter 
the model already first-differenced.  Thus, their estimated coefficients must be interpreted 
differently than the others.  For a dependent variable that is the first-difference in log 
SAA appropriations, the coefficient for Origin Year implies a 0.26% higher growth rate 
for an SAA founded in 1975 rather than 1965. 
8  The observed contemporaneous elasticity (0.13) is particularly interesting given the 
matching requirements of NEA grants (Lowell 2004).  The share of SAA budgets from 
NEA grants dipped below 50% decades ago.  A modest flypaper effect (Hines and Thaler 
1995) appears, as the median effect of an additional NEA dollar on SAA appropriations 
is to boost it by $0.39 in 2004.   
9  Adding fixed effects for SAA locations (state, culture, economic development, and 
independent) to Model 1, treating each variable as exogenous without taking first 
differences, yields effects not statistically significantly different from zero when tested 
individually and jointly. 
10  Of the 33 studies, 12 report both WTP and mean sample incomes.  The log of the 
average WTP (median when reported, otherwise mean) was regressed upon the log of the 
mean sample income, all in 2002 US$.  Because studies typically report valuation 
estimates for multiple goods, samples, or methods, a random effects regression is 
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employed to allow for study-specific error terms.  The regression with N = 42 yields a 
R2 = 0.37, income elasticity of 0.737, and a robust standard error of 0.14. 
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Table 1:  Variable Descriptions and Sources  
Variable Mean Std.Dev Description Source 
SAAt 14.25 1.50 log of real SAA appropriations in year t NASAA (2004) 
Revenuet 15.83 1.00 log of real general revenues in year t (a), various years 
Debtt 15.09 1.23 log of real debt outstanding in year t (a), various years 
NEAt 13.15 0.38 log of real NEA grants to state NASAA (2004) 
Population 14.88 1.03 log of population (estimates for intercensal 
years) 
(b) 
Density 0.24 0.32 Population per acre (a), 2005 
Black 0.11 0.12 proportion of population that is Black (b) 
Other 0.04 0.09 proportion of population that is nonwhite, and 
non-Black 
(b) 
Youth 0.31 0.04 proportion of population that is aged ≤ 19 (b) 
Elders 0.15 0.18 proportion of population that is aged > 65 (b) 
College 0.19 0.06 proportion of population aged > 25 with 
Bachelor’s degree or higher, imputed 
(b), (c) 
Income 9.99 0.22 log of real personal income (per capita) BEA (2005) 
RGovGrid 0.07 0.26 dummy for Republican governor, divided 
legislature 
(a), various years 
DGovGrid 0.08 0.28 dummy for Democrat governor, divided 
legislature 
(a), various years 
RGovDiv 0.19 0.39 dummy for Republican governor, Democrat 
legislature 
(a), various years 
DGovDiv 0.29 0.46 dummy for Democrat governor, Republican 
legislature [omitted category] 
(a), various years 
RUnified 0.14 0.35 dummy for Republican governor, Republican 
legislature 
(a), various years 
DUnified 0.28 0.45 dummy for Democrat governor, Democrat 
legislature 
(a), various years 
Turnout (%) 0.45 0.12 voter turnout (%) for last presidential election (a), various years 
Origin Year -3.90 9.77 year state established its SAA – 1969 various SAA websites 
BalanceBudg 1.46 0.64 categorical [0 – 2], with 2 indicating strictest 
budget rules 
ACIR (1987) 
Term Year 1, Term Year 2, 
Term Year 3 
dummy for first, second, or third year in the 
presidential term (e.g., Second=1 for 2005) 
 
Key:       (a)  Statistical Abstract of the United States, years as indicated. 
(b)  US Census website.  www.census.gov 
(c)  Author’s calculations.  Data collected from reports of the Current Population Survey published by 
the Census for 1970, 1980, 1989, 1990, 1993-2006.  Missing values imputed using state-by-state 
regressions with predictors: real per capita income, Youth, and the high school graduation rate, and a 
time trend.    
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Table 2:  Results of GMM Estimation of SAA Appropriations, 1969 – 2002. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable coeff. z coeff. z coeff. z 
SAAt-1 0.746*** 27.48 0.639*** 17.4 0.729*** 27.27 
Revenuet 0.101 1.31 0.175** 2.01 -0.044 -0.33 
Revenuet-1 0.059 0.88 0.186** 2.37 0.078 0.45 
Revenuet-2 -0.054 -1.26 0.062* 1.80 0.124*** 3.20 
Debtt -0.029 -0.86 -0.046 -1.49 -0.037 -1.09 
Debtt-1 -0.039 -1.46 -0.057* -1.92 -0.042 -1.54 
Debtt-2 0.052** 1.99 0.060** 2.11 0.052** 2.00 
NEAt 0.128** 2.13 0.105* 1.82 0.124** 2.06 
NEAt-1 -0.058 -0.89 -0.044 -0.75 -0.062 -0.97 
NEAt-2 0.090** 2.48 0.114*** 3.06 0.092** 2.47 
Population 0.299 1.51 -0.861* -1.69 0.472** 2.45 
Density 0.529 0.92 6.750*** 4.22 0.517 0.90 
Black 0.205 0.07 -5.331 -1.39 0.832 0.27 
Other 0.205 0.52 -0.115 -0.38 0.123 0.32 
Youth -2.649*** -2.73 -6.775*** -4.01 -2.851*** -3.03 
Elders -0.191* -1.8 -0.168 -1.25 -0.172* -1.88 
College 0.210 0.34 0.008 1.05 0.300 0.39 
Income 0.780** 2.54 0.898** 2.53 0.336 0.95 
RGovGrid 0.090** 2.11 0.074 1.50 0.091* 1.92 
DGovGrid 0.017 0.40 -0.005 -0.11 0.011 0.26 
RGovDiv 0.095*** 2.65 0.083** 2.08 0.096** 2.53 
RUnified 0.033 1.41 -0.010 -0.28 0.026 0.99 
DUnified 0.049 1.50 0.043 1.12 0.050 1.47 
Turnout (%) -0.164 -1.33 -0.125 -0.87 -0.146 -1.19 
Year -0.023** -2.36 -0.063*** -5.70 -0.029*** -2.86 
Term Year 1 -0.049* -1.96 -0.061** -2.56 -0.052** -2.07 
Term Year 2 0.020 0.77 0.014 0.54 0.019 0.73 
Term Year 3 0.012 0.35 0.015 0.47 0.012 0.38 
Origin Yeara 0.0003** 2.24 0.0001 0.44 0.0003** 2.36 
BalanceBudga 0.005* 1.94 0.021*** 5.63 0.006** 2.22 
State effectsa omitted  Yes  omitted  
+Revenuet     0.110 0.84 
+Revenuet-1     0.005 0.03 
+Revenuet-2     -0.250** -2.41 
+Income     0.756** 2.17 
No. of obs. 1521 1521 1521 
No. of groups 50 50 50 
Wald (df) 15560.40 (30) 2.45×1010 (52) 3.74×1010 (52) 
m2 -0.61 -0.78 -0.79 
Sargan’s s χ2(2005) = 27.53 χ2(2005) < 0.001 χ2(2005) < 0.001 
a These variables are not measured as first-differences. 
***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 3:  State Fixed Effects on Changes in SAA Appropriations 
State coeff. z Location State coeff. z Location 
AK -0.019 -1.27 Education MT -0.038*** -3.32 Independent 
AL -0.016 -1.43 Independent NC -0.022* -1.76 Culture 
AR -0.025** -2.18 Culture ND -0.004 -0.47 Independent 
AZ 0.013 0.68 Independent NEa   Independent 
CA -0.017 -0.99 Independent NH -0.021* -1.75 Culture 
CO -0.023* -1.76 Independent NJ -0.011 -0.48 State 
CT -0.011 -0.68 Independent NM 0.007 0.43 Culture 
DE -0.008 -0.41 State NV 0.019 0.86 Culture 
FL -0.052* -1.73 State NY 0.010 0.59 Independent 
GA -0.017 -1.04 Governor’s office OH -0.018 -1.62 Independent 
HI -0.015 -0.91 Accounting & General Services OK -0.005 -0.40 Independent 
IA -0.009 -0.82 Culture OR -0.015 -0.97 Indep./ Econ. Dev. 
ID -0.004 -0.26 State PA -0.001 -0.11 Governor’s office 
IL 0.002 0.13 Independent RI -0.026* -1.80 Independent 
IN 0.014 0.70 Independent SC -0.031** -2.52 Independent 
KS -0.008 -0.67 Independent SD -0.015 -1.36 Econ. Dev. 
KY -0.019 -1.58 Commerce Cabinet TN -0.026** -2.53 Independent 
LA -0.011 -0.86 Culture TX -0.013 -0.99 Independent 
MA -0.024 -1.39 Independent UT -0.023* -1.69 Econ. Dev. 
MD -0.009 -0.42 Econ. Dev. VA 0.010 0.55 Independent 
ME -0.035*** -3.27 Independent VT -0.049** -2.04 Independent 
MI 0.009 0.73 Culture WA -0.014 -1.00 Independent 
MN -0.001 -0.07 Independent WI 0.003 0.27 Independent 
MO -0.014 -0.99 Econ. Dev. WV -0.019 -1.60 Culture 
MS -0.017 -1.54 Independent WY -0.014 -1.22 Culture 
 
a Nebraska is the omitted state category.   
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Table 4: Summary of Key Expectations and Results 
Category 
Expected influence on 
appropriations (+/–/0) Source Result 
Fiscal 
pressures 
Revenues: + Olsen 2004 Only with state fixed 
effects 
Revenue declines have 
larger impact than 
revenue gains 
Lowell 2004 Yes, with a two-year lag 





Party control: 0 Getzner 2002 Nonzero effect for some 
situations 
SAA location: +, – Mulcahy 2002 No effect observed 
SAA age: + Hofferbert and 
Urice 1985 




Constituency: 0 Hofferbert and 
Urice 1985 
Only for some 
demographic groups 





Income: + Noonan 2004 Yes  
Urban population: + Lowell 2004 Yes, with state fixed effects 
Cultural diversity: – Rushton 2003 No effect observed 
Changing constituency 
effects over time 
Lowell 2004 Yes, for young, elderly, 
black, and density 
Negative time trend 
(from cultural 
diversification) 
Rushton 2003 Yes, but decay remains 
after controlling for 
demographic changes 
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